

Region 6 LEPC Update

Steve Mason, EPA Region 6
mason.steve@epa.gov
Hilary Gafford, Weston Solutions
hilary.gafford@westonsolutions.com



The Chemical Safety and Security Executive Order (E.O. 13650) -- U.S. EPA-OSHA-DHS

See Page 13 for a list of Acronyms used in this Update



In follow up to the tragedy that struck West, Texas, in April 2013, the President issued Executive Order 13650 - Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security (EO) on August 1, 2013 to improve chemical facility safety and security in coordination with owners and operators. (See

page 3 for complete text of the Order).

The EO directs DHS, EPA, DOL, DOJ, USDA, and DOT to identify ways to improve operational coordination with State and local partners; enhance Federal agency coordination and information sharing; modernize policies, regulations and standards in order to enhance safety and security in chemical facilities; and work with stakeholders to identify best practices to reduce safety and security risks in the production and storage of potentially harmful chemicals.

The EO also established a Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group, which includes each of these agencies.

Since the EO was issued, the Working Group has taken important steps towards substantial improvements in practices, operations, protocols, and policies to improve chemical facility safety and security.

This fact sheet provides a brief update on Working Group progress and is intended to supplement ongoing public engagement. Agencies will continue to work on improving chemical facility safety and security as outlined within the EO.

Stakeholder Input

Engaging and partnering with State regulators, State, local, and tribal emergency responders, chemical facility owners and operators, and local and tribal communities is critical to improving chemical facility safety and security.


The Working Group conducted listening sessions across the country as well as conducted two webinars in order to

solicit comments, best practices and suggestions from stakeholders on issues pertaining to improving chemical facility safety and security. Nearly two hundred individuals attended the first four sessions, which were held in Texas City, TX, Washington, DC, Springfield, IL, and Orlando, FL.

Coordination with State and Local Partners

Federal, State, local, and tribal governments have different responsibilities in addressing risks associated with chemical facilities, including response planning for potential emergencies. To improve the effectiveness and efficiency of risk management and response measures, the Working Group has made progress in coordinating operations and sharing information among Federal agencies and State, local, and tribal partners with jurisdiction over chemical facility safety or security.

The Working Group is drawing on input provided by these partners through listening sessions, a pilot program in New York and New Jersey, State and local responder participation with Federal agencies on RRTs, as well as other mechanisms.



Using this input, the Working Group has identified needs and developed a matrix of programs that could address these needs and support communities in their safety and security efforts. The matrix includes programs to better engage facilities in the local planning process, additional training for first responders, technical support to SERCs and LEPCs, and improving data management and sharing.

A plan to support and further enable Federal, State, and local entities and industry in their efforts to work together to improve chemical safety and security was issued in June 2014 (see page 6). Subsequently, the Working Group will seek further input with all stakeholders, via listening sessions and stakeholder meetings, with the goal of bringing local entities

and industry together and providing tools to address chemical risk in their communities.

In addition, as directed by the EO, ATF and DHS assessed their ability to more effectively share data with SERCs, TEPCs, and LEPCs in order to ensure key information is readily available to assist with preparedness planning while providing necessary protection of sensitive materials.

For example, ATF is exploring opportunities to share explosive licensing and permitting data with vetted members of the SERCs who have explosive storage in their jurisdiction. ATF also is working to update regulations to require any person who stores explosive material to notify local fire officials on an annual basis.

DHS is exploring opportunities to share certain CFATS data with vetted members of the SERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs. Presently that information is available to certain personnel within Federal agencies, State and local government, and State fusion centers that manage the flow of information and intelligence across levels and sectors of government to integrate information for analysis.



DHS is continuing to evaluate information sharing mechanisms for CFATS data in coordination with the stakeholder community to ensure the appropriate protection of sensitive information. In addition to the work that ATF and DHS are doing in accordance with the EO, EPA and OSHA also are continuing to identify ways to improve information sharing with SERCs, TEPCs, and LEPCs.

As a next step, the Working Group will continue to gather feedback during the listening sessions and evaluate best practices identified through the New York and New Jersey pilot program to inform the development of a standard operating procedure of a unified Federal approach for integrating with State, local, and tribal assets, for identifying and responding to risk in chemical facilities.

Federal Coordination and Information Sharing

In August 2013, the EO Working Group launched a pilot program in the New York and New Jersey region, the Effective Chemical Risk Management Project, Federal Region Two. The pilot program was established to evaluate best practices and test innovative methods for interagency collaboration on chemical facility safety and security.

The pilot's objectives include developing innovative and effective methods of collecting, storing, and using facility information to determine, locate and manage chemical risks; drafting an operating plan for Federal, State, local, and tribal governments for collection, storage, and use of facility information as well as methods for effective outreach to stakeholders; and, determining the challenges and

opportunities in conducting joint inspections of high risk facilities.

Under the pilot program, the Working Group currently is formulating an understanding of chemical facility risk throughout the region, ensuring that local responders have access to key information, and evaluating processes and protocols for sharing of information.

The pilot also is improving coordination of inspections, such as sharing inspection schedules, cross-training inspectors, and inter-agency referrals of possible regulatory non-compliance as it begins development of a unified Federal approach for identifying and responding to risks in chemical facilities. As part of that effort, EPA, ATF, and OSHA officials continue to hold discussions with the CSB to improve coordination and exchange of information during investigations of chemical incidents.



Collection and Interagency exchange of information

The Working Group is exploring ways to harmonize the collection and exchange of information to streamline enforcement processes, inform decision-makers at all levels of government and first responders, and avoid duplication of regulatory requirements.

The Group also is assessing methods that Federal and State agencies can use to identify chemical facilities that have not met their regulatory obligation or are otherwise out of compliance with important safety and security requirements.

To date, the EO Working Group members have exchanged data to help evaluate chemical facility compliance with existing Federal requirements and identify appropriate enforcement actions.

Additionally, these Agencies have defined data collection and sharing needs, such as establishing terminology that would be used by all agencies in referring to and collecting the same data; identified a tool to assist with integrating and searching regulatory databases; and developed protocols to facilitate the sharing of information with Federal, State, local, and tribal entities. These findings are guiding work over the next 90 days to produce a proposal for a coordinated, flexible data-sharing process.

Specifically, the findings will be used to make facility information more readily accessible, propose a common way to identify facilities and chemical substances, and identify mechanisms to ensure information is available to those who need it without compromising facility security.

Lastly, the findings will be used to formulate a proposal for a way to increase Federal efficiency and decrease the burden to those required to submit information by creating a single data input point for regulated or potentially regulated chemical facilities, so that data provided by a facility can be provided once and used by all relevant Federal agencies.

Modernizing policies, programs, and requirements

The Working Group has identified options to improve chemical facility risk management practices through agency programs, private sector initiatives, government guidance, outreach, standards, and regulations.



For example, the Working Group is specifically considering options to improve the safe and secure storage, handling, and sale of ammonium nitrate; opportunities to address additional regulated substances and hazards under EPA's RMP regulation, OSHA's PSM standard and revisions to DHS' CFATS

chemicals-of-interest list; as well as other potential improvements.

We developed these options by reviewing existing programs, lessons learned from major incidents, recommendations from safety and security communities, and feedback from EO listening sessions. The Working Group intends to engage stakeholders and collect public comments on these options. We will use that input to develop a plan for implementing practical and effective improvements to chemical risk management.

Further supporting this effort, EPA, OSHA, and ATF issued an interim chemical advisory on August 30

(www.epa.gov/emergencies/guidance.htm#rmp) focused on the safe storage, handling, and management of ammonium nitrate.


The advisory provides facility owners and operators, as well as emergency planners and first responders, the lessons learned from recent ammonium nitrate incidents, including the explosion in West, TX.

The advisory will be updated, as necessary, with any new information from stakeholders regarding the safe storage, handling, and management of ammonium nitrate.

In another important step, OSHA released a RFI related to modernization of PSM and related standards to meet the goal of preventing major chemical accidents. The OSHA RFI, <https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/12/09/2013-29197/process-safety-management-and-prevention-of-major-chemical-accidents>, also seeks input on specific areas of interest including application of the PSM standard to ammonium nitrate, reactive chemicals, or certain retail facilities that handle highly hazardous chemicals.

Chemicals and the facilities that manufacture, store, distribute and use them are essential to our economy. However, recent incidents have reminded us that the handling and storage of chemicals present serious risks to communities and the public that must be addressed.

The EO Working Group has taken positive steps to improve safety and security and build on Federal agencies' ongoing work to reduce the risks associated with hazardous chemicals.



EXECUTIVE ORDER 13650: IMPROVING CHEMICAL FACILITY SAFETY AND SECURITY

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Purpose. Chemicals, and the facilities where they are manufactured, stored, distributed, and used, are essential to today's economy. Past and recent tragedies have reminded us, however, that the handling and storage of chemicals are not without risk. The Federal Government has developed and implemented numerous programs aimed at reducing the safety risks and security risks associated with hazardous chemicals. However, additional measures can be taken by executive departments and agencies (agencies) with regulatory authority to further improve chemical facility safety and security in coordination with owners and operators.

Sec. 2. Establishment of the Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group. (a) There is established a Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group (Working Group) co-chaired by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Administrator of EPA, and the Secretary of Labor or their designated representatives at the Assistant Secretary level or higher. In addition, the Working Group shall consist of the head of each of the following agencies or their designated representatives at the Assistant Secretary level or higher:

- i. DOJ;
- ii. USDA; and
- iii. DOT.

(b) In carrying out its responsibilities under this order, the Working Group shall consult with representatives from:

- i. The CEQ;
- ii. The National Security Staff;

- iii. The Domestic Policy Council;
- iv. The Office of Science and Technology Policy;
- v. The OMB;
- vi. The White House Office of Cabinet Affairs; and
- vii. Such other agencies and offices as the President may designate.

(c) The Working Group shall meet no less than quarterly to discuss the status of efforts to implement this order. The Working Group is encouraged to invite other affected agencies, such as the NRC, to attend these meetings. Additionally, the Working Group shall provide, within 270 days of the date of this order, a status report to the President through the Chair of the CEQ and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.

Sec. 3. Improving Operational Coordination with State, Local, and Tribal Partners. (a) Within 135 days of the date of this order, the Working Group shall develop a plan to support and further enable efforts by State regulators, State, local, and tribal emergency responders, chemical facility owners and operators, and local and tribal communities to work together to improve chemical facility safety and security. In developing this plan, the Working Group shall:

- i. Identify ways to improve coordination among the Federal Government, first responders, and State, local, and tribal entities;
- ii. Take into account the capabilities, limitations, and needs of the first responder community;
- iii. Identify ways to ensure that State homeland security advisors, SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, TEPCs, State regulators, and first responders have ready access to key information in a useable format, including by thoroughly reviewing categories of chemicals for which information is provided to first responders and the manner in which it is made available, so as to prevent, prepare for, and respond to chemical incidents;
- iv. Identify areas, in collaboration with State, local, and tribal governments and private partners, where joint collaborative programs can be developed or enhanced, including by better integrating existing authorities, jurisdictional responsibilities, and regulatory programs in order to achieve a more comprehensive engagement on chemical risk management;
- v. Identify opportunities and mechanisms to improve response procedures and to enhance information sharing and collaborative planning between chemical facilities, TEPCs, LEPCs, and first responders;
- vi. Working with the NRT and RRTs, identify means for Federal technical assistance to support developing, implementing, exercising, and revising State, local, and tribal emergency contingency plans, including improved training; and
- vii. Examine opportunities to improve public access to information about chemical facility risks consistent with national security needs and appropriate protection of confidential business information.

(b) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General, through the head of the ATF, shall assess the feasibility of sharing data related to the storage of explosive materials with SERCs, TEPCs, and LEPCs.

(c) Within 90 days of the date of this order, Homeland Security shall assess the feasibility of sharing CFATS data with SERCs, TEPCs, and LEPCs on a categorical basis.

Sec. 4. Enhanced Federal Coordination. In order to enhance Federal coordination regarding chemical facility safety and security:

(a) Within 45 days of the date of this order, the Working Group shall deploy a pilot program, involving the EPA, DOL, DHS, and any other appropriate agency, to validate best practices and to test innovative methods for Federal interagency collaboration regarding chemical facility safety and security. The pilot program shall operate in at least one region and shall integrate regional Federal, State, local, and tribal assets, where appropriate. The pilot program shall include innovative and effective methods of collecting, storing, and using facility information, stakeholder outreach, inspection planning, and, as appropriate, joint inspection efforts. The Working Group shall take into account the results of the pilot program in developing integrated SOPs pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

(b) Within 270 days of the date of this order, the Working Group shall create comprehensive and integrated standard operating procedures for a unified Federal approach for identifying and responding to risks in chemical facilities (including during pre-inspection, inspection execution, post-inspection, and post-accident investigation activities), incident reporting and response procedures, enforcement, and collection, storage, and use of facility information. This effort shall reflect best practices and shall include agency-to-agency referrals and joint inspection procedures where possible and appropriate, as well as consultation with the FEMA on post-accident response activities.

(c) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Working Group shall consult with the CSB and determine what, if any, changes are required to existing MOUs and processes between EPA and CSB, ATF and CSB, and OSHA and CSB for timely and full disclosure of information. To the extent appropriate, the Working Group may develop a single model MOU with CSB in lieu of existing agreements.

Sec. 5. Enhanced Information Collection and Sharing. In order to enhance information collection by and sharing across agencies to support more informed decision-making, streamline reporting, and reduce duplicative efforts:

(a) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Working Group shall develop an analysis, including recommendations, on the potential to improve information collection by and sharing between agencies to help identify chemical facilities which may not have provided all required information or may be non-compliant with Federal requirements to ensure chemical facility safety. This analysis should consider ongoing data-sharing efforts, other federally collected information,

and chemical facility reporting among agencies (including information shared with State, local, and tribal governments).

(b) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Working Group shall produce a proposal for a coordinated, flexible data-sharing process which can be utilized to track data submitted to agencies for federally regulated chemical facilities, including locations, chemicals, regulated entities, previous infractions, and other relevant information. The proposal shall allow for the sharing of information with and by State, local, and tribal entities where possible, consistent with section 3 of this order, and shall address computer-based and non-computer-based means for improving the process in the short-term, if they exist.

(c) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Working Group shall identify and recommend possible changes to streamline and otherwise improve data collection to meet the needs of the public and Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies (including those charged with protecting workers and the public), consistent with the Paperwork Reduction Act and other relevant authorities, including opportunities to lessen the reporting burden on regulated industries. To the extent feasible, efforts shall minimize the duplicative collection of information while ensuring that pertinent information is shared with all key entities.

Sec. 6. Policy, Regulation, and Standards Modernization.

(a) In order to enhance safety and security in chemical facilities by modernizing key policies, regulations, and standards, the Working Group shall:

- i. Within 90 days of the date of this order, develop options for improved chemical facility safety and security that identifies improvements to existing risk management practices through agency programs, private sector initiatives, Government guidance, outreach, standards, and regulations;
- ii. Within 90 days of developing the options described in subsection (a)(i) of this section, engage key stakeholders to discuss the options and other means to improve chemical risk management that may be available; and
- iii. Within 90 days of completing the outreach and consultation effort described in subsection (a)(ii) of this section, develop a plan for implementing practical and effective improvements to chemical risk management identified pursuant to subsections (a)(i) and (ii) of this section.

(b) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of Agriculture shall develop a list of potential regulatory and legislative proposals to improve the safe and secure storage, handling, and sale of ammonium nitrate and identify ways in which ammonium nitrate safety and security can be enhanced under existing authorities.

(c) Within 90 days of the date of this order, EPA and the Secretary of Labor shall review the chemical hazards covered by the RMP and the PSM and determine if the RMP or PSM can and should be expanded to address additional regulated substances and types of hazards. In addition, the EPA and the DOL shall develop a plan, including a timeline and resource requirements, to expand, implement, and enforce the RMP and PSM in a manner that addresses the additional regulated substances and types of hazards.

(d) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall identify a list of chemicals, including poisons and reactive substances that should be considered for addition to the CFATS COI list.

(e) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Labor shall:

- i. Identify any changes that need to be made in the retail and commercial grade exemptions in the PSM Standard; and
- ii. Issue a Request for Information designed to identify issues related to modernization of the PSM Standard and related standards necessary to meet the goal of preventing major chemical accidents.

Sec. 7. Identification of Best Practices. The Working Group shall convene stakeholders, including chemical producers, chemical storage companies, agricultural supply companies, State and local regulators, chemical critical infrastructure owners and operators, first responders, labor organizations representing affected workers, environmental and community groups, and consensus standards organizations, in order to identify and share successes to date and best practices to reduce safety risks and security risks in the production and storage of potentially harmful chemicals, including through the use of safer alternatives, adoption of best practices, and potential public-private partnerships.


Sec. 8. General Provisions. (a) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law, including international trade obligations, and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

- i. The authority granted by law to a department, agency, or the head thereof; or
- ii. the functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

BARACK OBAMA, THE WHITE HOUSE, August 1, 2013.



Actions to Improve Chemical Facility Safety and Security – A Shared Commitment

Report for the President -- May, 2014

As stated in the Executive Order 13650 above, the Working Group was to provide, within 270 days of the date of the order, a status report to the President. The following is from the Status Report submitted to the President in May, 2014.

Message from the Working Group Tri-Chairs

Recent catastrophic chemical facility incidents in the United States prompted President Obama to issue Executive Order (EO) 13650 - Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security on August 1, 2013, to enhance the safety and security of chemical facilities and reduce risks associated with hazardous chemicals to owners and operators, workers, and



communities. The EO directed EPA, DOL, DHS, DOJ, USDA, and DOT to identify ways to improve operational coordination with State, local, tribal, and territorial partners; to

enhance Federal agency coordination and information sharing; to modernize policies, regulations, and standards to enhance safety and security in chemical facilities; and to work with stakeholders to identify best practices to reduce safety and security risks in the production and storage of potentially harmful chemicals. The EO established a Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group to oversee this effort, which is tri-chaired by the EPA, DOL, and DHS and includes leadership and subject matter experts from each of the above listed Departments and agencies. The Working Group, its member agencies, and the broader community of stakeholders have practices, operations, protocols, and policies that address chemical facility safety and security but all recognize that improvement is necessary and requires a shared commitment from all stakeholders.

Emergency responders, in particular, have needs to be addressed and capabilities to be strengthened so that they can better manage threats and hazards in their communities. The report summarizes Working Group progress, focusing on actions to date, findings and lessons learned, challenges, and priority next steps. The issuance of the report is a milestone, not an endpoint. Agencies, in coordination with the broad range of stakeholders, have transitioned to implementation of these priority actions, which will be completed over time. We recognize that the Federal Government must put in place a transparent, inclusive process with the engagement and commitment of all stakeholders. The Working Group

recognizes the invaluable contributions of the stakeholder communities that participated in each of the EO information-gathering efforts. The report highlights many of the comments we received, comments that provide context and underscore the findings and next steps. More information on the spectrum of stakeholder comments is available on the EO Webpage <https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder>.

The Working Group strongly encourages stakeholders to continue to contribute to this dialogue by submitting successful practices to the chemical facility safety and security online best practices forum at <https://www.llis.dhs.gov/topics/chemical-facility-safety-and-security> or by providing direct feedback to the Federal departments and agencies via the EO docket or the eo.chemical@hq.dhs.gov email address.

Executive Summary

Introduction

Chemicals are an essential part of the economy and can improve the life, health, and well-being of people across our Nation. However, the handling and storage of chemicals at facilities

can present safety and security risks that must be addressed. Executive Order (EO) 13650 - Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security directs the Federal Government to:

- Improve operational coordination with State, local, and tribal partners;
- Enhance Federal agency coordination and information sharing;
- Modernize policies, regulations, and standards; and
- Work with stakeholders to identify best practices.

To accomplish these goals, the EO established a Federal interagency working group (Working Group) led by EPA, DOL, and DHS and including other departments and agencies involved in the oversight of chemical facility safety and security. Recognizing that stakeholders are essential to managing and mitigating the risks of potential chemical facility hazards, the Working Group initiated a robust stakeholder outreach effort to assist the workgroup in identifying successes and best practices.

A thorough analysis of the current operating environment, existing regulatory programs, and stakeholder feedback resulted in immediate actions and a consolidated



Federal Action Plan of future actions to further minimize risks, organized by five thematic areas:

- Strengthening community planning and preparedness;
- Enhancing Federal operational coordination;
- Improving data management;
- Modernizing policies and regulations; and
- Incorporating stakeholder feedback and developing best practices.

The report highlights current activities to improve chemical facility safety and security and provides a plan for moving forward. It is important to emphasize accomplishing this strategy requires a shared commitment among facility owners and operators; Federal, State, tribal, and territorial governments; regional entities; nonprofit organizations; facility workers; emergency responders; environmental justice and local environmental organizations; and communities.

Strengthening Community Planning and Preparedness

Facilities storing and using hazardous chemicals are found in all types of communities. Communities need to know where hazardous chemicals are used and stored, how to assess the risks associated with those chemicals, and how to ensure community preparedness for incidents that may occur. Communities must also take into consideration local geographic and socioeconomic issues and address the differing needs of sensitive populations, for example, individuals with special medical needs, children, or those with transportation challenges. Strengthening communities' planning and preparedness requires a sound process.




Stakeholder Input

There is broad consensus in the stakeholder community that the most effective emergency planning occurs at the local level, with LEPCs and TEPCs providing a formal prevention and preparedness engagement structure. Stakeholder input noted that many of the LEPCs and TEPCs do not have the capabilities to conduct emergency planning and require training and resources, which has made it difficult for industry and others to engage in planning with LEPCs and TEPCs. Stakeholders underscored the importance of joint planning and exercising. State and local officials also identified the need for access to timely, usable, understandable information from facilities and the Federal Government for emergency response planning, land use



planning, and identification of potentially noncompliant facilities (outliers).

Community members expressed concern about a perceived lack of effective communication from industry partners regarding incidents and general facility safety performance. Additional concerns were shared regarding local plans to shelter in place, evacuate, or relocate during an incident as well as recovery support to include consideration of community members with chronic special medical needs or those facing socioeconomic challenges. Communities adjacent to multiple facilities also raised concerns regarding the failure to address the specific vulnerabilities of lower-income communities, including environmental justice considerations.



Actions Taken

The Working Group took a number of steps to address these concerns, including:

1. DHS and EPA engaged with LEPCs and first responders across the country to identify and discuss potential methods to increase first responder preparedness and to share lessons learned across departments.
2. EPA continued to upgrade its CAMEO suite to provide more useful and accurate information to emergency personnel and the public.
3. FEMA educated State Administrative Agencies on how the Homeland Security Grant Program allows risk-centric, capabilities-based planning and preparedness training for chemical incidents.

Future Actions to Strengthen Community Planning and Preparedness

The Working Group identified five priority action areas to help strengthen community planning and preparedness, to include:

1. Strengthening SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs.
2. Improving first responder and emergency management preparedness and response training.
3. Identifying and coordinating resources for SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs to sustain planning and response efforts.
4. Expanding tools to assist SERCs, TERCs, LEPCs, and TEPCs in collecting, storing, and using chemical facility information.
5. Enhancing awareness and increasing information sharing with communities around chemical facilities.

Enhancing Federal Operational Coordination

The chemical community is comprised of owners and operators; Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments; regional entities; nonprofit organizations; and communities. Communicating and coordinating across this diverse landscape requires an integrated effort to ensure activities are executed effectively and efficiently.

Stakeholder Input

Stronger collaboration within the Federal community for various chemical facility regulatory program



requirements and information collection efforts is a crucial component of success. Many stakeholders also want close collaboration between State regulatory programs and other holders of key planning and prevention information. State and industry partners believe that enhanced regulatory coordination and outreach across the chemical community would facilitate compliance and address potentially noncompliant facilities. First responders, LEPCs, and community residents believe that information and data-sharing efforts need significant improvement. Specifically, they want to be able to easily obtain the most actionable information in a user-friendly format to support planning efforts yet with recognition of the need to find the right balance for this access with the need to protect information due to safety and security considerations.

Actions Taken

The Working Group took a number of actions to enhance Federal operational coordination, including:

1. The Working Group initiated a pilot in the New York-New Jersey area bringing together regional Federal employees and State and local agencies to serve as a test-bed, confirming lessons learned, collecting and assessing best practices, informing other initiatives directed by EO 13650, and developing novel solutions to address safety and security challenges.
2. Members of the Working Group engaged the CSB to identify possible updates to existing memorandums of understanding between CSB and EPA, CSB and OSHA, and CSB and the ATF.

Future Actions to Enhance Federal Operational Coordination

The Working Group identified three priority action areas to help enhance operational coordination, including:

1. Coordinating EO implementation activities.

2. Establishing SOPs for Federal coordination at the National and regional levels.
3. Cross training Federal chemical facility safety and security field personnel to provide awareness of related regulatory programs.


Coordination among Federal agencies needs to be bolstered at the national and regional levels to ensure continued progress toward implementation of the activities identified in this report. Coordination is already occurring and has improved chemical facility safety and security management across the Federal sector; however, it must be systematic and institutionalized. The EO called for the Working Group to create comprehensive and integrated SOPs for a unified Federal approach for identifying and responding to risks in chemical facilities. The SOP for a unified Federal approach is described in Appendix E of the report. The Federal SOP describes the membership, scope, roles, and responsibilities of the National and Regional Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Groups.

The National Working Group disseminated the lessons learned from development of the New York-New Jersey pilot SOP and required each RRT develop SOPs tailored to their respective regions. Templates from the pilot were distributed, and the remaining RRTs developed their individual SOPs within 1 year of receiving the templates. These SOPs described (1) procedures for a unified Federal, State, tribal, and local approach for identifying, communicating, and responding to risks at chemical facilities and (2) operational coordination procedures, such as joint drills and exercise, electronic Tier II data management, and revised inspection protocol for Federal, State, tribal, local agencies, and first responders. The Region 6 SOPs are described, starting on page ____.

Improving Data Management

The EO charged the agencies with developing a coordinated, flexible, data-sharing process, to address the need to optimize available information. While Federal agencies collect valuable information on chemical facility safety and security, differing formats and management of these data do not fully support interagency compliance analysis.

This was evident as the Working Group Agencies worked to share data across the respective systems. Currently, there



is no chemical security and safety data clearinghouse that contains all of the data points germane to all Federal agency regulations.

Stakeholder Input

Stakeholders identified concerns with duplicative databases and the need for multiple entries of the same or similar data. This duplication stems in part from multiple regulatory programs that developed and evolved over decades, with each incorporating technologies and data collection requirements independent of one another (often due to differing statutory requirements). Stakeholders expressed the need to improve current data-sharing practices, and suggested creating a single system capable of handling all Agencies' facility reporting requirements.

Actions Taken

The Working Group took a number of actions to improve data management, including:

1. EPA updated its FRS, to include relevant OSHA PSM and DHS CFATS data.
2. Members of the Working Group engaged in data sharing across regulatory programs—such as the DHS CFATS program and EPA's RMP—to help locate potentially non-compliant facilities by identifying facilities that had registered with one regulatory program but not the other.
3. EPA Region 8 tested a new ER Planner system that aggregates chemical facility and infrastructure data from various Federal and State databases and displays it on an interactive GIS application.
4. DHS worked with all State HSAs to show them how to access information on facilities within their jurisdictions.
5. DHS engaged trade associations to foster outreach to potentially noncompliant facilities that have not been engaged in the past and to help raise awareness about chemical facility security regulations.



Future Actions to Improve Data Management

The Working Group identified four priority actions areas that it will take to improve data management, including:

1. Establishing a dedicated cross-agency team of experts to standardize data and develop a common facility identifier.
2. Aggregating data from across the Federal agencies and establishing a single Web-based interface for data collection.
3. Improving information tools for regulated chemicals.

Modernizing Policies and Regulations

EO 13650 directed the Working Group to modernize key policies, regulations, and standards. In support of this requirement, the Working Group reviewed existing programs, recommendations from the safety and security communities, and feedback from the EO listening sessions, as well as investigative reports of major incidents. From this review, the Working Group published a preliminary list of options for improving chemical facility safety and security for stakeholder comment.

Stakeholder Input

Many stakeholders expressed the need to modernize policies and regulations, while others said the focus should be on better enforcement of existing standards. Some industry groups expressed their belief that no new regulations are necessary. Opinions varied greatly on topics such as safer alternatives, information sharing, emergency planning, and enhanced coverage of ammonium nitrate. Chemical facility workers, LEPCs, first responders, and professional associations suggested actions that could be taken by industry to increase safety and security in and around chemical facilities, including empowering workers and encouraging employee participation in all elements of process safety such as reporting programs (for near misses and process upsets), investigating accidental releases, and participating in process hazard analyses.




There was agreement among facility owners and operators, plant workers, community members, environmental and union organizations of the importance of prevention of risks including the benefits of implementing safer alternatives where possible. There was, however, no consensus about the role of government in the implementation of safer alternatives.

Some stakeholders were concerned about how to address the proximity of chemical facilities to residents and sensitive populations such as schools and hospitals. Community residents expressed an interest in participating in citizen advisory groups to further engage in planning and prevention efforts, and influence any future policy or regulatory changes.

Actions Taken

The Working Group took a number of actions related to modernizing chemical facility safety and security policies and regulations, including:

1. The Working Group published a solicitation of public input on options for policy, regulation, and standards modernization.
2. OSHA published a RFI on the agency's PSM standard and other related chemical standards to determine, among other things, whether these standards can, and should, be expanded to address additional regulated substances and types of hazards.
3. Working Group agencies, often with input from other stakeholders, also developed and disseminated various advisories or guidance materials across Federal program areas to inform and support communities, industries, and local officials.
4. EPA expanded its inspector training curriculum to include advanced process safety training courses in several key areas such as mechanical integrity codes and standards, root cause investigation, and human error prevention. Notably, prior to the issuance of the EO, EPA published revised guidance for RMP Inspectors to ensure employee representatives participate in all RMP inspections.
5. DHS conducted over 100 CAVs to date in FY 2014 to assist CFATS-regulated facilities in understanding and meeting the program's risk-based security standards.



Future Actions to Modernize Policies and Regulations

The Working Group identified ten priority action areas to modernize chemical facility safety and security policy and regulations, including:

1. Modernizing OSHA's PSM standard to improve safety and enforcement.
2. Modernizing EPA's RMP regulation.
3. Enhancing ammonium nitrate safety and security.
4. Promoting safer technology and alternatives.
5. Building a stronger CFATS program.
6. Developing guidance and outreach programs to help industry understand process safety and security requirements and best practices.
7. Working with States to improve SDWA measures to prevent and prepare for chemical spills.
8. Working with Congress to strengthen and increase OSHA monetary and criminal penalties.
9. Working with Congress to pursue statutory amendment to the Safe Explosives Act.
10. Improving process for notification of stored explosives to fire authorities.

Incorporating Stakeholder Feedback and Developing Best Practices

To gather the concerns of stakeholders, establish best practices, and collect lessons learned from a broad spectrum of stakeholders, the Working Group organized listening sessions around the Nation; held meetings with key State, local, and industry stakeholders; and established public dockets.



Stakeholder Input

Community partners expressed a strong desire for continued stakeholder engagement and a mechanism to share information in a simple, coordinated manner. Community residents and organizations believe they should be included in the majority of efforts described in the EO to ensure the local perspective is represented.

They also want to share their perspectives on alignment with the Executive Order 12898 – Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low Income Populations. Stakeholders promoted their best practices, including stewardship programs, safer alternatives, community engagement, and effective State and local planning efforts. Stakeholders believe there are lessons they can learn from one another, enabling all facilities around the Nation to be safer and more secure.



Actions Taken

The Working Group took a number of actions related to incorporating stakeholder feedback and developing best practices, including:

1. Solicited feedback via listening sessions, Webinars, meetings with stakeholder groups, attending stakeholder conferences and collecting information through public dockets, engaging nearly 1,800 participants across the country, and generating input from over 25 States.
2. Development and launch of an online repository such that stakeholders involved in chemical facility safety and security can submit and access best practices. The newly launched repository can be found at <https://www.llis.dhs.gov/topics/chemical-facility-safety-and-security>.

Future Actions to Incorporate Stakeholder Feedback and Develop Best Practices

The Working Group identified two priority action areas to ensure stakeholder feedback continues to be incorporated and best practices are shared, including:

1. Continue to solicit stakeholder feedback and conduct regular outreach as actions in this report are pursued.
2. Capture and share best practices with all stakeholders.

Roles and Responsibilities

The following provides a summary of the key roles and responsibilities of those entities involved in the EO implementation.

1. Executive Committee (EPA, DOL/OSHA, DHS)

The EO 13650 Working Group leadership, at the Assistant Secretary level, has responsibility for overall conduct of efforts in furtherance of the goals and activities in support of the execution of the EO and will continue to chair a Federal-level interagency coordinating committee. The Executive Committee will:

- a) Provide management and leadership to ensure that EO Regions function effectively; ensure they work as an efficient and effective team, pooling talents and experience from the RRTs and other standing regional organizations.
- b) Leverage the NRT, RRTs, and GCC/SCCs to support the EO Working Groups by providing cross-sector coordination with State, local, and tribal governments and the chemical sector. Will coordinate, on behalf of the Working Groups, strategies, activities, policies, and communications across governmental organizations with the SERCs, LEPCs, tribal, and territorial organizations, the Oil and Natural Gas Sector Coordinating Council, and the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council.
- c) Designate a Chemical Facility Safety and Security National Working Group at the SES Level, which will be chaired by EPA, DOL/OSHA, and DHS (USCG and NPPD) and will include SES representation from other relevant agencies such as DOJ/ATF, DHS (FEMA and TSA), and DOT.

2. National Working Group (USCG, NPPD, EPA, and DOL/OSHA Headquarters; SES Level)

Meetings will take place monthly to oversee the execution of actions related to improving chemical facility safety and security.

- a) Designate Chemical Facility Safety and Security Regional Working Groups at the Federal civil service general schedule grade of 15 or SES level, including in those groups representatives of all Federal agencies that play a role in regulating chemical safety and/or security.

- b) Execute the guidance from the National Working Group and oversee the regional management of EO activities.
 - c) Provide quarterly updates to the National Working Group, the NRT and the GCCs/SCCs.
 - d) Ensure the Regional SOPs are developed and maintained as necessary.
 - e) Leverage the support of the NRT and the GCCs/SCCs as required to ensure the effective execution of EO related activities.
- #### 3. Regional Working Group (DHS, EPA, and OSHA)
- a) Oversee field-level management and execution of duties related to the EO and ensure regional consistency in operations and reporting. Establish and manage a regional coordinating committee that includes representatives from all relevant Federal agencies.
 - b) Manage and track cross-regional EO-related activities.
 - c) Assign, manage, and track EO-related tasks performed by regional personnel,
 - d) Coordinate and execute related tactical-level assignments.
 - e) Update the National Working Group, and the RRT
 - f) Coordinate with SERCs, TERCs, State homeland security advisors, State fire marshals, and other State agencies as required.
 - g) Implement regional SOPs to define roles and responsibilities, operations, and coordinating structures.
 - h) Coordinate and execute inspections and outreach planning and prioritization.
 - i) Cross-train Federal inspectors on basics of other agencies' programs and institute protocols to be executed regarding interagency referrals of information.

EPA, OSHA and DHS have the statutory responsibility to ensure the safety, security and health of the public and America's workforce through the timely and effective implementation of a number of federal laws and implementing regulations. In some areas, the responsibilities of the Agencies are separate and distinct, in others, they are complementary. EPA, OSHA and DHS will work together to maximize the efforts of these Agencies to protect workers, the public, and the environment and enhance security at chemical facilities.

A. EPA Authorities and Responsibilities

EPA responsibilities include the protection of public health and the environment by promoting compliance with federal environmental statutes and regulations, including the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA, among others. Agency functions are performed through standards setting and rulemaking, technical reviews, audits and studies, public

hearings, issuance of permits and licenses, compliance assistance outreach, investigations and enforcement, and evaluation of operating experience and research.

B. OSHA Responsibilities

OSHA is responsible for enforcing the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. 651 et. seq. The goal of the OSH Act is to assure, so far as possible, that every working man and woman in the nation has safe and healthy working conditions. To achieve that purpose, the OSH Act provides broad authority for a variety of activities and programs designed to reduce the number of occupational safety and health hazards at places of employment. Among these is the authority to promulgate mandatory safety and health standards for workplaces and to conduct inspections of such workplaces to determine compliance with the OSH Act and with OSHA standards.

C. DHS Responsibilities

The Department of Homeland Security regulates high-risk chemical facilities under the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program (CFATS), 6 C.F.R. Part 27. Under CFATS, facilities that have been finally determined by DHS to be high-risk are required to develop and implement security plans that meet applicable risk-based performance standards (RBPS). CFATS was created pursuant to Section 550 of the Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, which gave DHS regulatory authority over security at high-risk chemical facilities. Congress re-authorized and amended the program

in 2014 through the CFATS Act of 2014 (6 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.).

Conclusion

Preparedness is an ongoing, evolving process. We hope to see the momentum established since the release of the EO carried forward through improved coordination structures, enhanced information sharing mechanisms and technologies, updated and streamlined regulations, and more effective enforcement of the Nation's laws.

Details and specific activities to be taken to accomplish the priority actions from the thematic areas are outlined in the Federal Action Plan section that follows and are further detailed in the report. Many of these actions have already been put in place or will be instituted in the next year, while the success of other improvements relies on longer-term planning, coordination, and action.

In collaboration with the many partners referenced throughout this report, we will continue to work together to increase the safety and security of chemical facilities, of the workers who are the lifeblood of the industry, and of the surrounding communities. It is a shared commitment, and every stakeholder has an important role to play in chemical facility safety and security. We are striving to improve safety and security of chemical facilities with our partners on behalf of the American public.

Region 6 Standard Operating Procedures to Implement the Chemical Safety and Security Executive Order (13650)

The Federal government, in partnership with State and local government, has determined a need to address the issues underscored by the West, Texas tragedy, which occurred in April, 2013. On August 1, 2013 President Obama signed an EO -- 13650 to improve chemical facility safety and security.

The Executive Order is designed to enhance the safety and security of chemical facilities and reduce risks associated with hazardous chemicals to owners and operators, workers, and communities.

The Executive Order directed EPA, DOL, DHS, DOJ, USDA, and DOT to identify ways to improve operational coordination with State, local, tribal, and territorial partners; to enhance Federal agency coordination and information sharing; to modernize policies, regulations, and standards to enhance safety and security in chemical facilities; and to work with stakeholders to identify best practices to reduce safety and security risks in the production and storage of potentially harmful chemicals.

This Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group, which is tri-chaired by the EPA, DOL, and DHS, developed a consolidated Federal Action Plan of future actions to further minimize risks, organized by five thematic areas:

1. Strengthening community planning and preparedness;
2. Enhancing Federal operational coordination;
3. Improving data management;
4. Modernizing policies and regulations; and
5. Incorporating stakeholder feedback and developing best practices.

The Working Group identified three priority action areas to help enhance operational coordination (theme #2 above), including:

1. Coordinating EO implementation activities.
2. Establishing SOPs for Federal coordination at the National and regional levels.
3. Cross training Federal chemical facility safety and security field personnel to provide awareness of related regulatory programs.

In the report back to the President, *Actions to Improve Chemical Facility Safety and Security – A Shared Commitment*,

May, 2014, the Working Group committed each of the ten Federal Regions to develop SOPs. The SOPs, modeled after SOPs developed by Region II, are tailored to the needs of each Region, and focus on coordination with State and local partners on chemical preparedness, prevention, and response. For more information on the Chemical Facility Safety and Security Executive Order, visit:

<https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/>

RWGs were established in all ten Federal Regions under the leadership of regional tri-chairs from DHS, EPA, and OSHA. In Region 6, an RWG was established with representatives from each of the three agencies, and have been meeting monthly since the fall of 2014. The Region 6 Working Group agreed on eight (8) SOPs (see below) to develop and implement. All three agencies led the development of the various SOPs. Each draft SOP was provided to members of the Region 6 RRT, particularly our State partners, for review and comment, before they were finalized. Additionally, a status report on the SOPs is given at each semi-annual RRT meeting. This ensured Region 6 State partners were involved in the process, and were able to give feedback on priorities within their own State. Once an SOP had been reviewed by the Working Group members and stakeholders, it was signed by the Working Group Tri-Chairs. Once all eight SOPs were finalized, the complete packet of SOPs was signed by the three Agency Regional Administrators. Implementation of the SOPs would commence after this final sign-off.

These eight SOPs, or initiatives, will begin or continue efforts being taken by our respective agencies in coordination with our State and local partners, as well as industry, to enhance chemical preparedness, prevention, and response actions. Additionally, these Procedures will assist in coordination between our three agencies and our chemical safety and security programs.

Dated: **August 03, 2015**

John M. Hermanson, Regional Administrator, OSHA Region 6
Ron Curry, Regional Administrator, EPA Region 6
Paul Gilbreath, Regional Administrator – CFATS, DHS Region 6

1. Administration of the Workgroup

This SOP establishes the administration of the workgroup, including reports, working with the Region 6 RRT, and implementation of the SOPs developed by the workgroup. If implementation or development of an SOP would include the RRT, the workgroup will submit the proposal to the RRT, to follow the established RRT process. The SOP will describe how the workgroup and SOPs will be sustained.

2. Incident Commander Standard for Senior Fire Department Personnel / HAZMAT Training for First Responders

This SOP develops efforts to coordinate with State Training Officers, as well as State training academies (TEEX, LSU, OSU, etc) to help in ensuring local response officials have the appropriate ICS/NIMS training (ICS 100, 200 and NIMS 700, 800), as well as advanced ICS training programs. Additionally, the SOP will describe efforts to coordinate with federal and state partners to work toward ensuring responders have the appropriate level of HAZMAT training for the position and duties they occupy. This will include outreach on the Region 6 HAZWOPER Awareness training, and the Region 2 Chemical Safety training, as well as ensuring responders understand the OSHA 29 CFR 1910.120 and EPA 40 CFR 311 requirements.

3. Participation on the Region 6 Regional Response Team (RRT)

This SOP describes efforts of the RRT to ensure agencies, at the federal and state level, which have chemical safety and security responsibilities, are appropriately represented on the Region 6 RRT. This would include State health agencies, emergency management agencies, and Poison Control Centers.

4. Improving Coordination with Federal and State Agencies on Programs, Roles, and Contacts / Getting to Know You.

This SOP develops coordination with the RRT to have each agency on the RRT (state and federal) develop a one page summary of their regulatory programs for chemical safety and security. The compilation of these summaries will be shared with local/state/federal officials to assist officials in knowing which agency to refer to potential violations to, as well as information each agency may maintain on chemical safety and security. Will include how this information can be useful to federal and state agencies in response and prevention coordination.

5. EPCRA Outreach / Enforcement for State/local Officials

This SOP develops outreach to regulated facilities under EPCRA on the appropriate selection of emergency contacts on the Tier II form submitted to local and state officials (should be a local contact). Additionally, provide guidance to facilities on the importance of providing proper contact information during a release report. Through the Region 6 LEPC Update, encourage local officials to verify contacts, during drills, exercises or other events.

6. Guide to Provide First Responders with Access to Single Point of Contact for Facility Chemical Information

This SOP develops an outreach card for fire fighters and responders to identify people and agencies that they can reach back to and get the interpretations and chemical specific information they need. Card will be provided to States and LEPCs electronically to distribute to local responders. Card will identify Subject Matter Experts so responders can reach back for expertise on databases and interpretation of fixed chemical facility data.

7. LEPC Outreach

This SOP develops new, and continues existing, practices to support LEPCs, including those who need assistance to continue or increase their activity. This will include established practices (HOTZONE, LEPC Update, workshops, LEPC website), but will also encourage use of local exercises for participation by those facilities covered by EPCRA/RMP/PSM/CFATS. LEPCs which have developed or implemented an innovative process or material will be encouraged to share with other LEPCs through the LEPC Update or other means.

8. Inter-Agency Inspections and Enforcement Procedures

This SOP identifies procedures for all agencies, federal and state, which have chemical safety and security responsibilities, for sharing information, as appropriate. This would include providing Points of Contact within each agency for data sharing on inspection/enforcement results; procedures for referring facilities to other agencies; determine the appropriateness of joint inspections; and encourage the participation of local officials on certain types of inspections. Reinforce to local and state officials on the appropriate procedures for referring potential enforcement cases to EPA, DHS, or OSHA through outreach; train enforcement inspectors for RMP, SPCC/FRP, PSM, and CFATS programs on chemical safety/security compliance, so they can provide outreach to facilities during inspections. Conduct interagency training on chemical safety / security enforcement programs for inspectors focusing on RMP, PSM, CFATS, EPCRA, and SPCC/FRP programs.

Acronyms Used in this Update

ATF: Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms	LEPC: Local Emergency Planning Committee
CAMEO: Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations	MOU: Memorandum of Understanding
CAV: Compliance Assistance Visit	NIMS: National Incident Management System
CEQ: Commission on Environmental Quality	NPPD: National Protection and Programs Directorate
CFATS: Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards	NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
COI: Chemicals of Interest	OMB: Office of Management and Budget
CSB: U.S. Chemical Safety Board	OSHA: Occupational Safety and Health Administration
DHS: Department of Homeland Security	PSM: Process Safety Management
DOJ: Department of Justice	RFI: Request for Information
DOL: Department of Labor	RMP: Risk Management Program
DOT: Department of Transportation	RRT: Regional Response Team
EO: Executive Order	RWG: Regional Working Group
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency	SCC: Sector Coordinating Council
EPCRA: Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act	SDWA: Safe Drinking Water Act
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency	SERC: State Emergency Response Commission
FRS: Facility Registry Service	SES: Senior Executive Service
GCC: Government Coordinating Council	SOP: Standard Operating Procedure
GIS: Geographic Information System	SPCC: Spill Prevention and Control Countermeasures
HAZWOPER: Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response	TEPC: Tribal Emergency Planning Committee
HSA: Homeland Security Advisor	TERC: Tribal Emergency Response Commission
ICS: Incident Command System	USDA: Department of Agriculture

State EPCRA / LEPC Coordinators and SERC Contacts

Arkansas	Kenny Harmon	501-683-6700	kenny.harmon@adem.arkansas.gov
Louisiana	Gene Dunegan	225-925-6113	gene.dunegan@dps.la.gov
New Mexico	Henry Jolly	505-476-6240	henry.jolly@state.nm.us
Oklahoma	Tom Bergman	405-702-1013	tom.bergman@deq.ok.gov
	Bonnie McKelvey	405-521-2481	bonnie.mckelvey@oem.ok.gov
Texas	Bernardine Zimmerman	800-452-2791	Bernardine.zimmerman@tceq.texas.gov

Emergency Response Numbers

Arkansas Dept. of Emergency Management	800-322-4012
Louisiana State Police	877-925-6595
New Mexico State Police	505-827-9126
Oklahoma Dept. of Environmental Quality	800-522-0206
Texas Environmental Hotline	800-832-8224
National Response Center	800-424-8802
EPA Region 6	866-372-7745
CHEMTREC	800-424-9300



- The articles herein are provided for general purposes only.
- EPA does not accept responsibility for any errors or omissions or results of any actions based upon this information.
- Please consult the applicable regulations when determining compliance.
- Mention of trade names, products, or services does not convey, and should not be interpreted as conveying official EPA approval, endorsement, or recommendation.